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Abstract
The need for long-term care (LTC) represents a “new social risk,” one that overlaps with and complements 
systems of care that pre-date such programs, complicating LTC program design. This commentary expands on 
Ikegami’s discussion of how these structural factors must be accommodated, as well as historical and cultural 
factors that influence public expectations of such a program. The commentary specifically focuses on the role 
of cash payments, caregiver benefits, and the sometimes indistinct line between LTC and health systems. The 
experiences of countries operating LTC program in a wide range of contexts can illuminate common challenges, 
as well as some potential solutions to these vexing design and operational issues. 
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Long-term care (LTC) is a relatively new public and health policy concern, one that results from successes in improving population health as well as declines in 
fertility across industrialized nations. Because of its relative 
newness, government efforts to respond to the growing 
demand for LTC must necessarily build on existing systems, 
fundamentally shaping the issues that arise. 
Indeed, in many cases, a government’s need to act is based 
on pressures that the demand for LTC care places on existing 
public programs: Ikegami notes how overutilization of Japan’s 
hospitals by older people (and the associated pressure on 
healthcare costs) was a key factor behind the introduction 
of its LTC insurance (LTCI) program.1 The adoption of 
Germany’s program was due, in part, to cost pressures on the 
social assistance program financed by regional government, 
which funds nursing home stays for the poor.2,3 While any 
public program must build on and co-exist with established 
systems, LTC is particularly tricky because it overlaps with 
so many other policy areas: most obviously, a country’s 
healthcare system, but also with housing, labor, retirement, 
and family policy, so that boundaries between programs 
differ from country to country. Moreover, because so many of 
these areas are influenced by contentious and shifting societal 
norms – particularly around the role of the family generally 
and women specifically – the design of LTC programs can be 
difficult to negotiate. 
This unavoidable variation across countries – in how a 
society sets goals for its LTC program and how it delineates 
LTC – reinforces Ikegami’s point about the difficulty of 
comparing programs. For example, a key difference lies in 
the role of family caregivers, and the extent to which cash 
payments are intended to pay for their work. Ikegami includes 
allowances to family caregivers as a LTC expense, reasoning 
that they are equivalent to cash payments. While care 
allowances are certainly meant to compensate carers for their 
work, it not clear that cash payments are primarily meant to 
benefit family caregivers. 
Indeed, the goal of cash payments differs across countries. 
For example, in the US’s Medicaid program (the largest payer 
of LTC in the country, funding LTC on a means-tested basis), 
most states’ cash for care programs ban payments to spouses, 
and often ban payments to family members living with the 
care recipient. Even where permitted, not all care recipients 
choose to use cash payments to hire relatives. In other 
countries as well, cash payments are used to hire independent 
workers. Indeed, in some cases the political rationale for 
cash payments is to help develop and recruit a professional 
workforce. In contrast, feminists in Japan campaigned 
against including a cash benefit in the Japanese program, on 
the grounds that it would consolidate the role of women in 
providing LTC (a concern also in South Korea and Taiwan) 
– clearly assuming that a cash payment would be used to 
compensate family caregivers. These differences reflect the 
varying meanings of cash payments: whether they aim to 
benefit care recipients, enabling them to operationalize choice 
in who provides care (its predominate meaning in countries 
that fall into the Anglo-liberal welfare state category4), only 
indirectly benefitting family caregivers, or whether they act as 
family income supplements, meant to compensate carers for 
the work they do (as it is in Germany – although Germans, too, 
use cash payments to hire independent workers as necessary). 
However, benefits for carers fit awkwardly with many 
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countries’ LTC programs, often constituting a separate 
category and funded through separate payment streams 
– often, because they cover situations other than eldercare. 
(Many such policies focus on childcare.) While benefits such 
as respite fall clearly into the LTC bucket, other caregiver 
benefits are harder to classify. For example, some US states 
have introduced paid family leave (which provides income 
to those caring for disabled or elderly persons as well as for 
children), typically financed out of payroll taxes. In Germany, 
however, the public LTCI program finances unemployment, 
health insurance, and LTCI contributions for carers as well as 
contributions to Germany’s statutory pension fund, and paid 
leave is taken as a personal loan. If, however, a carer leaves 
employment, the LTCI program’s cash benefit can become a 
family income supplement, underlining how a cash benefit 
is fungible in some countries, but not where there are strict 
controls over their use.5,6 
The case of caregiver benefits highlights the difficulty 
of distinguishing LTC from other services and programs. 
Ikegami notes another example: nursing homes, an issue that 
arises due to the increasingly severe health status of nursing 
home residents. Worldwide, countries are striving to limit 
nursing home admission to people with more serious health 
conditions, and to provide most LTC in community-based 
settings – ideally, in people’s own homes. Rising acuity levels 
among nursing home residents have raised the cost of nursing 
homes and, in turn, created incentives to limit access. More 
importantly, they have blurred the distinction between the 
types of care delivered in nursing homes and in other settings 
that traditionally fall in the health sector, such as post-acute/
rehabilitative and long-term chronic care. Concurrently, such 
shifts have created a need to find ways of serving significantly 
disabled individuals in community-based settings; delivering 
health-related services in those settings; and ensuring quality 
and coordination for those services. One of the Dutch 
program’s recent reforms was to acknowledge this distinction, 
formally shifting the costs of home nursing out of the LTC 
program and into the health sector. However, this shift, along 
with other changes that split responsibility for LTC, has 
created its own problems: namely, poor coordination across 
entities and the creation of incentives to cost-shift.7 
The Dutch program illustrates some issues that can arise 
out of a poorly-defined program, leading to high costs: the 
Dutch spent roughly 3.7 % of gross domestic products on 
LTC in 2015, compared to the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development average of 1.7%.8 This can 
be attributed to their early adoption of social insurance for 
LTC, back in 1968,9 with an initial, problematic design: the 
program covered a broad range of risks; utilized nursing 
homes heavily; had porous boundaries with other programs; 
and had high premiums from the very start. The program’s 
name – the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ), now 
the Long-term care Act (Wlz) – hints at how broad its initial 
goals were: in addition to explicitly covering LTC, it covered 
rehabilitation, hospital stays of over a year, and mental health 
care. The program also covered people of all ages. Thus, 
a major cause of budget pressures resulted from demand 
from children with learning disabilities, autistic spectrum 
diagnoses, and intellectual disabilities who otherwise lacked 
services. To solve these problems, a 2015 reform re-allocated 
program responsibilities among several different programs, 
leading to the aforementioned concerns about increasing 
fragmentation and cost-shifting. 
This potted history of the Dutch program aims to highlight 
the importance of defining the core constituency of a LTC 
program and the needs that a program is aiming to address 
– as well as the influence that other areas of health and 
social policy can have on LTC programs. A key cost-control 
component of the Japanese program is that is it limited to 
older people and those with specified “geriatric diseases,” 
an approach that South Korea has copied.10 The German 
program, in contrast, covers people of all ages, and recently 
revised its eligibility assessment to more explicitly cover 
people with dementia.11 Indeed, many LTC programs cover 
people of all ages. The downside of a unified program is that it 
can create a large political constituency supporting expanded 
benefits (leading to expanded costs); the differing political 
constituencies may also have significantly different goals. On 
the other hand, separate programs can create discontinuities 
and inequalities across populations. For example, Australia 
operates a generous LTC program for younger people with 
disabilities and a less generous aged care program, creating 
problems as people transition from one to the other. However, 
other political issues can arise if it is perceived that benefits 
received by older people are at the expense of younger or 
future generations, an issue that Japan has addressed by 
limiting the contribution base for its LTCI program to people 
40 or older. 
Although LTC’s emergence as a “new social risk”12 is 
complicated by its need to complement existing systems, 
the field has benefitted considerably from cross-national 
learning. Germany purposefully incorporated cost control 
mechanisms into its design. Japan built on the German 
program, while South Korea, in turn, learned from Japan’s 
experience; notably, it intentionally started small,13 as Ikegami 
recommends, with strict eligibility criteria and comparatively 
low contribution levels. Taiwan, too, has carefully studied 
other countries’ design in developing its yet-to-be-launched 
program, although, interestingly, it has seen a backlash 
against the social insurance model recommended by its policy 
experts,14,15 – a development that should remind the reader 
that local politics and history will nearly always trump careful 
planning. History also affects what citizens feel is owed them, 
which in turn influences how a program evolves. Although 
social insurance models are critiqued for creating a sense 
of entitlement among citizens, entitlement can arise from 
historical or social factors, as the evolution of Japan’s program 
demonstrates.
Ikegami concludes by advising countries to start early in 
developing their LTC programs, so they can start small and 
constrain expectations – good advice, certainly. However, 
things rarely goes as planned: gestation periods for LTC 
programs can be extremely long. While researchers and 
policy experts—not to mention ordinary people—understand 
the critical and pressing need for LTC programs, politicians 
often see this as a low priority in the face of conflicting 
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demands on the public purse. In both the case of Germany 
and Japan, a political catalyst was needed to induce the birth 
of the programs; many countries, including Taiwan and the 
United States, await their catalysts. Meanwhile, countries 
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